On last November 17, the UNSC approved a resolution submitted by the United States on the day after in Gaza. The resolution, numbered 2803, establishes a “Peace Council” as a transitional adminstration body with an international legal personality tasked with setting the framework and coordinating funding for Gaza’s reconstruction, until the Palestinian Authority completes its reform program in a satisfactory manner. The resolution designates Trump as the President of this council. It also links the resumption of humanitarian aid to cooperation with the Peace Council and with partnering organizations such as the United Nations. The resolution authorizes member states participating in the Peace Council to enter into the necessary arrangements defined by the resolution including provisions related to privileges and immunities, and the creation of operational entities with discretionary powers to carry out their functions. Among these is a non-political Palestinian committee composed of Gaza residents, responsible for the day-to-day running of civil services and administration in the Strip under the supervision of the Peace Council. The resolution further authorizes the Council to establish a temporary international stabilization force in Gaza under its leadership, with the participation with other states and accompanied by a newly trained and vetted Palestinian police force, to help secure border areas and stabilize the security environment in Gaza, ensuring the disarmament of the Strip. It notes that the operational entities will be funded through voluntary donor contributions, Peace Council financing mechanisms, and governments. According to the resolution, the Council’s civilian and international presence will continue until the end of 2027, subject to expanding the mandate by the Security Council.

The so-called Peace Council referenced in UNSC Resolution 2803 is not an international body with legal personality. It was formed through a unilateral American decision, and it is not a mandated or neutral transitional administration, as it reflects the interests and objectives of the United States. Nor is it an official occupation authority, since it coordinates with and supports the presence and goals of another occupying power, Israel. The establishment of this council creates a legal grey zone that exceeds what is recognized in international law, positioning it as a quasi-supra-legal entity deriving its status and power from the influence and dominance of the United States. This raises several questions, first and foremost among them: Does the transitional authority (The Peace Council) included by the American resolution meet the criteria of a legitimate transition, or does it constitute a form of external authority imposed on a population under occupation, similar to the Iraq experience in 2003? Can an occupying power or a state sponsoring anoccupying power grant a supra-local body such as the Peace Council constitutional powers within an occupied territory? And does the UNSC resolution effectively reproduce the occupation’s authority in a new institutional form? This article also highlights structural risks, such as the potential entrenchment of political guardianship over Palestine by the United States through its monopolization of decision-making in Gaza, the fragmentation and weakening of Palestinian legitimacy, and the transformation of Gaza into a security-economic model shaped according to American preferences.

Although the resolution makes reference to relevant UN resolutions, it does so without specifying them and, in practice, diverges from them. The U.S. sponsored resolution does not cite the legal frameworks tied to Resolution 242 (1967). When it mentions a Palestinian state, it frames this as conditional upon reform of the Palestinian Authority and ties it to the 2020 U.S. plan, rather than linking it to UN Resolution 1515 (2003), which endorsed the “Road Map” and explicitly referenced the two-state solution. The resolution also fails to reaffirm the rejection of any reduction of Gaza’s territory, a principle included in Resolution 2735 (2024) and in Resolution 1860 (2009), which called for the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. Moreover, the current resolution ties the coordination of aid and humanitarian corridors to the supervision and coordination of the Peace Council, while earlier UN resolutions assigned such responsibilities to international and humanitarian mechanisms, as outlined in Resolution 2720 (2023).

The resolution violates binding norms of international law. Although it refers to the right to self-determination, it renders that right conditional, even though it is a fundamental principle affirmed in Article 1 of the UN Charter and consistently upheld by international courts. In its 2004 advisory opinion on the Separation Wall, the International Court of Justice held that any measure imposing political arrangements on the Palestinian people without their freely expressed will constitutes a violation of the right to self-determination. The resolution also breaches the Hague Regulations of 1907, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and its Additional Protocol I of 1977, all of which obligate the occupying power to respect the existing laws of the occupied territory, prohibit the transfer of sovereignty or the establishment of new political arrangements, and forbid the imposition of administrative or political structures on the occupied population. This contradicts the substance of the U.S. resolution, which mandates a fundamental restructuring of the existing political and administrative system amounting to a complete re-engineering of governance in the territory. Additionally, the Protocol recognizes national liberation movements as parties to the conflict, which precludes the redefinition of political representation for the Palestinian people under occupation. Customary international law also prohibits the occupying power from using imposed local institutions to administer the population, indicating that the provisions contained in the resolution lack legality within this framework.

The proposal in the resolution to establish a Peace Council headed by a political figure, President Trump, constitutes an unprecedented arrangement that undermines the principle of neutrality typically upheld by the United Nations in international peace agreements and similar operations. The United States is not considered a neutral party by Palestinians; on the contrary, it is a strong ally of Israel. The resolution was crafted in coordination with Israel, the occupying power in Gaza, to impose an administration on occupied territory without the consent of the Palestinian people and without a UN mandate, introduced instead under the guise of a resolution to end the war. International law does not permit the establishment of an “administration in occupied territory” except through a UN resolution, a multilateral international agreement, or explicit consent from the people or the legitimate authority of the territory.

The resolution also uses the phrase “take all necessary measures” when defining the scope and powers of the Peace Council’s security force. This terminology is typically employed in Security Council resolutions only when authorizing the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as was the case in Resolution 1031 (1995) concerning Bosnia, for example. This means that the current resolution effectively authorizes the security force it creates to use force in Gaza without a UN mandate based on the collective action mechanism defined under Chapter VII of the Charter.Even if we were to assumepurely for argument’s sake that the Security Council granted legitimacy to the Peace Council and its associated security force through Resolution 2803, this would still be incorrect, as such authorization would require procedures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Moreover, the Security Council does not possess the authority to create an entity that contradicts international law, particularly essential norms, a point affirmed by the International Court of Justice in its 1971 Namibia advisory opinion, which clarified the limits of the Council’s powers. This means that Resolution 2803 did not grant an international mandate from the Security Council to establish the Peace Council or its security force in accordance with the established procedures of the United Nations system.

The idea of the Peace Council appears to draw inspiration from international peace-building entities modeled after UN peacebuilding mechanisms, yet the current resolution fundamentally contradicts their essence. Through Security Council resolutions, the United Nations can establish bodies that support peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflicts, without granting them permanent status. The UN or other international actors has, in multiple peace processes, appointed transitional governments or temporary international administrations through Security Council authorization or the consent of the concerned states. Examples include the civilian and security structures established in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. All of these models differ fundamentally from the Peace Council. Each was created under UN leadership, represented by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, and established through a resolution issued by an international organization with clear and well-defined objectives. None of them operated under the control of a single state. In contrast, the Peace Council was founded through the unilateral will of one state and operates under its authority. It lacks a UN mandate and functions within occupied territory, meaning under the control of another state. This makes it a new type of functional political entity tied directly to the interests of the United States and Israel.

The Peace Council represents an institutional model that differs from all known and established patterns. While it formally resembles an international transitional entity, it was created and is administered unilaterally under U.S. leadership. Within its structure, different forms of sovereignty intersect and overlap, distorting its institutional character. Between the authority of the United States, the primary actor controlling the Council and its multinational security force and affiliated local force, the authority of the occupying Israeli government, which the Council cooperates with as a principal partner, the limited international authority confined to delivering humanitarian assistance, and the legitimate sovereignty of the occupied Palestinian people, the overall picture becomes highly ambiguous. The Council also operates across multiple layers, complicating its classification, a supranational civilian authority, a security force derived from it, and a subordinate local authority. This is a complex structure that differs from the hierarchical operation of internationally recognized entities. Moreover, the Council lacks the established mechanisms of oversight, transparency, and accountability, making it difficult to evaluate its work particularly in the absence of any legitimate source of authority.

According to Resolution 2803, the Peace Council is described as a transitional body with an international legal personality. However, unlike other international entities, it was not created through a Security Council mandate, rather, its establishment was mentioned within the context of a resolution aimed at halting the war on Gaza. Furthermore, possessing legal personality requires a set of conditions related to the entity’s function, such as the existence of a founding charter, a defined institutional structure, functional independence from the states operating within its framework, clear specification of the rights and obligations of those states, and delineated limits of responsibility and mechanisms for accountability. None of these conditions are fulfilled in the case of the Peace Council.

Although the steps to establish the Peace Council and its associated security force have not yet succeeded, the Council is already engaged in organizing legislative rules in Gaza an egregious legal violation. While some temporary international entities have been granted quasi constitutional authority allowing them to enact provisional regulations for the executive and legislative branches, build institutions, and set clear constitutional and electoral pathways, such authority has always been tied to Security Council resolutions issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as in the cases of Kosovo and East Timor. Occupation law sets strict limits on any constitutional engineering imposed by an occupying power or any body operating in coordination with it. The legal structure of the occupied territory may only be altered to the extent strictly necessary for security reasons or to fulfill obligations under international law, while local criminal laws must remain in force. Any attempt to reshape the local system of governance beyond these necessities constitutes a violation of the legal framework governing occupation. Responsibility over the occupied territory remains squarely with the occupying power, and the right to self-determination of the population under occupation, a non-derogable right, must be preserved. Transferring such institutional engineering to a non UN entity lacking a clear international mandate, such as the Peace Council, exceeds the bounds of the law.

The Palestinians can take immediate action to thwart U.S. Israeli attempts to bypass their legitimacy especially amid the current international momentum reflected in recent recognitions of the State of Palestine. This can be done by outlining a clear path to accelerate the adoption of a constitution and prepare for presidential, legislative, and local elections, under an internationally supervised electoral mechanism. The process should follow a two stage model, a constitutional referendum first, followed by general elections, using a secure digital platform for both the referendum and voting, linked to Palestinian identity or national ID numbers, and placed under the supervision of an international cybersecurity expert committee. Such a system would frustrate the occupying power’s attempts to prevent voting in Jerusalem, Gaza, or any area under its control.

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