Op Ed: Internationalizing the Palestinian Prisoners Question
- Details
- Published on Monday, 23 January 2012 09:59
By: Ameer Makhoul
(a Palestinian civil society leader and political
prisoner at Gilboa Prison)
The success of internationalization can be gauged by the extent to
which the issue or question concerned becomes a global concern. This
means creating a situation on the ground which makes it impossible for
the international system to continue shirking responsibility, or
colluding with a dominant or powerful party in usurping the rights of
a weaker victim. International mechanisms can then be brought into
play to support the restoration of the victim's rights and enforce
compliance on the violator.
In such cases, justice is the victim's most potent weapon to offset
the power and repressive force of the dominant party – in this case,
the racist colonial regime of Israel.
But there is a basic rule that has been proven and reaffirmed by every
popular revolution and liberation movement: it is not sufficient for a
group or people to be victims of injustice to earn the world's
solidarity. For the world to support them, these victims must not only
be conscious of and committed to their rights but more importantly,
they must resist their oppression and oppressors. The victims' own
steadfastness, defiance and struggle is key to transforming
international sympathy into solidarity, in the sense of effective
political action with a strategic horizon.
Internationalization lies essentially and primarily in activating and
sustaining global popular solidarity, as well as acting to encourage
official international bodies to assume their responsibilities.
A mobilized, energized and expanded worldwide solidarity movement can
do much to influence governments, legislatures and media in countries
and societies throughout the world. It can put pressure on
international and official bodies to promote policy changes on two
fronts: to support and strengthen the victims of injustice and their
hopes of attaining their rights via a combination of their liberation
struggle and international legality, and to weaken and isolate the
oppressive and racist colonizer, subject it to sanctions and deny it
legitimacy, with the ultimate goal being the dismantling of its
repressive structures.
Defining goals
Yet the official Palestinian position on the release of Palestinian
prisoners in Israeli jails serves to undermine their cause, which is a
central component of our people's liberation struggle.
The official stance, essentially, is that no final peace agreement
with Israel will be signed until all prisoners are released from
Israeli jails. In practice, this is a recipe for delaying and
deferring the liberation of the prisoners indefinitely, and
marginalizing the issue within the overall Palestinian agenda.
Liberating the prisoners should mean liberating them now.
Israel went to great lengths to turn the case of one of its occupation
troops who fell into Palestinian captivity into an international
humanitarian concern, while demanding that the world view and treat
its 7,000 Palestinian prisoners of freedom as "terrorists."
Yet why does Palestinian official discourse defer to this twisted
logic? Why does the party with justice on its side, the victim, need
to make excuses for Palestinians defending their rights? Why employ
apologetic language? When was the last time an official Palestinian
voice was raised at the UN or EU – or even the Arab League – to
defend the Palestinians' right, and duty, to resist occupation,
colonization and displacement employing all means of struggle?
This same mentality recently prompted a senior Palestinian Authority
(PA) official to raise the issue of "mutual incitement" and demand
that Israel reactivate the joint committee supposedly dealing with
this issue. How can a supposed representative of a people who are
subject in their entirety to colonization, displacement and
confinement accept any equivalence in this regard between the
aggressive occupying oppressor and its victims?
This is directly relevant to the issue of the prisoners. The official
Palestinian position on the international stage is to "condemn
violence" and thus denounce acts of resistance against the
occupation, while committing to close cooperation with the Israeli
security establishment. What message does that send to prisoners
incarcerated in Israeli jails for tens of years, who took part in the
liberation struggle and are paying the price for doing so? Doesn't
the official Palestinian stance negate their status as prisoners of
freedom, national liberation, conscience and justice?
If a message is ever to gain international popularity or official
traction, it must be clear and coherent. This is absolutely crucial
for internationalization. The words and actions of Palestinian
officialdom must be in harmony with those at the popular level, civil
society, grassroots movements, and also with the international
solidarity and support movement.
That is vital in order to avoid any repetition of the painful
experience of the campaign in the UK to boycott Israeli universities
as part of a wider academic and cultural boycott of Israel. This
constituted an unprecedented and strategic escalation in the role and
effectiveness of solidarity movements. Yet within weeks of the launch
of the campaign, the PA's Al-Quds University at Abu-Dis concluded a
cooperation agreement with the Israeli Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
That dealt a blatant stab in the back to the worldwide movement of
solidarity with the Palestinian people.
One must also question how much importance the PA and PLO really
accord to the prisoners issue – in their international diplomacy and
at the UN, in their meetings with the Israelis, and as a Palestinian
national priority. It is impossible to justify their failure to press
it as a central issue in political talks over the years, one that
cannot be ignored and must be resolved as a condition of further
progress.
Prisoner exchange deals cannot in themselves address the question as a
whole. Awaiting a promised peace deal as the magic solution is an
exercise in futility. Nor can the release of the prisoners be treated
as subject to the Israeli legal system. The Israeli judicial
establishment is an intrinsic part of the system that sustains and
legitimizes the occupation and the racist state and whitewashes their
crimes.
Yet the issue of the prisoners remains a core element of the conflict,
and its outcome is determined by balances of power. The Arab
revolutions are sure to have a decisive effect both on the regional
power-balance and on the management of the conflict. In this context,
internationalization provides a way of changing the rules of the game
that have prevailed so far, and breaking free of their control.
Alternatively, the official leadership's retreat from its role, and
the accompanying decline in popular struggle, leaves the prisoners
with few options other than to go on hunger strike. Yet this does not
necessarily achieve even short-term or minor gains, let alone advance
the cause of their liberation. There is a need for new forms of
struggle to be devised within the prisons, and linked more effectively
to the wider struggle and its strategic objectives.
Civil society
There is a wide array of Palestinian, Arab and international human
rights and civil society organizations that are credible, competent
and have a long and rich record of defending Palestinian rights,
obviously including the prisoners' issue. Palestinian organizations
can collaborate with their counterparts around the world to press for
policy changes in favor of Palestinian rights and establish networks
of relationships.
Official Palestinian representative offices must also do more to
facilitate such work, encourage grassroots input and engagement, and
provide it with official support it. Decentralization and
complementarity are required. Regrettably, official policy and
behavior has all too often obstructed and conflicted with unofficial
campaigning work. This was most apparent in the case of the
Palestinian and international Boycott, Sanctions, and Divestment (BSD)
campaign against Israel. Palestinian officialdom opposed it, citing
the negotiations underway with the Israeli government of Ehud Olmert.
The task of internationalization should be entrusted to a National
Coordinating Committee, including representatives of popular
organizations and civil society along with officials, both from within
historic Palestine and the Diaspora. The roles of all groups should be
coordinated with the appreciation that the Palestinian cause is an
indivisible whole, and that Israel too is one and the same. In other
words, the occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, the racist regime
within the Green Line, and the uprooting and ethnic cleansing of the
refugees and displaced, are all products of the Israeli state's
colonial and racist nature.
The pitfalls of priorities
In the process of managing the conflict, there are essential issues
which must not be shelved or deferred. No Palestinian official or
negotiator is entitled to sideline them in favour of other issues,
even if results cannot be reached on all simultaneously.
A wholesale Palestinian and Arab re-evaluation is required of the
chosen strategy of negotiating on the basis of achieving interim
solutions, and the effect this has had on the Palestinians' rights
and their struggle to achieve them. The disastrous effect of the Oslo
accords in this regard has become clear over the past two decades. By
sub-dividing basic Palestinian rights into separate components, they
were turned into hostages to each other and bargaining chips – the
attainment of one package of rights made contingent on conceding
another.
On the international level, it may sometimes appear that diplomatic
gains can be made by prioritizing one set of fundamental rights – or
one issue, such as the colonial settlement in the West Bank and
Jerusalem – over the others. But there is a risk of this seeming,
both at home and abroad, to abandon those rights which, for whatever
reasons, the current Palestinian leadership does not deem a priority.
For example, the Palestinian official campaign to focus worldwide
attention on the settlements carries the implicit message,
inadvertently or not, that freeing the prisoners is not such a high
priority.
No Palestinian official negotiator has ever been heard to threaten to
halt talks with Israel unless the prisoners are freed, or even that a
timetable for their liberation be discussed, or to raise the issue at
the Security Council. This is due to a Palestinian political decision,
or reluctance to take a stand given the prevailing regional and
international balance of power. It reaffirms the disastrous legacy of
the Oslo accords, in terms of both substance and implementation. All
issues related to Palestinian rights that were deferred under Oslo
remain deferred, and look like remaining so indefinitely. This applies
to the issue of refugees and the displaced, and to Jerusalem. And
that's not to mention the Palestinian leadership's tacit
acceptance that the 1948 Palestinians are a domestic Israeli affair
– a notion which they themselves, needless to say, utterly reject
and resist by all means available.
With regard to the prisoners, experience shows that Israel does not
adhere to its declared principle of refusing to release prisoners who
were involved in actions in which Israelis were killed. The same
applies to its refusal to negotiate the release of residents of
Jerusalem and the 1948 territories. It is the balance of power that
counts, and this is not a constant. It can change, largely in
accordance with the level of Palestinian popular struggle, official
Palestinian policy, and the Palestinian will as a whole.
The cause of liberating the prisoners requires the struggle to be
waged on two complementary fronts, within and outside the prison
walls.

